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Brazilian economy was the most dynamic in terms of growth among developed and developing 
economies from post-War until 1980, when a severe external constraint interrupted this trend. We 
propose in this paper a model, based on Kaldor, where capital accumulation, technological gap and 
long  run  external  constraint  are  connected.  Our  hypothesis  is  that  capital  accumulation,  under 
certain  circumstances,  can  overcome  external  constraint  if  the  accumulation  effort  promotes 
structural change increasing the importance of sectors more technological-intensive. It is expected 
that the structural change in this direction will contribute to an increase in the income-elasticity of 
exports and to a decrease in income-elasticity of imports, resulting in the increase in the growth rate 
of real product compatible with the balance of payments equilibrium in the long period. The last 
part of the paper shows that the high investment rate observed in the Brazilian economy from the 
post-War until the end of the 1970s resulted in the deepening of the import substitution process, 
what, in our interpretation, contributed to partially increase the long run growth rate of the Brazilian 
economy compatible with the balance of payment equilibrium.  
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Capital Accumulation, External Restriction, Technology Gap and Structural 
Change: Theory and the Brazilian Experience 
 
I – Introduction 
 
Economic development is defined, in the Latin American structuralist tradition, as a 
process of continuous increase in per capita income spurred by growing labor productivity 
resulting from the adoption of indirect production methods, i.e., methods in which there is 
an  increasing  technical  division  of  labor  among  activities,  which  in  turn  increases  the 
amount  of  capital  per  worker  (Rodriguez,  2009,  p.80).  In  other  words,  economic 
development  results  from  technical  progress,  which  is  induced  or  enabled  by  the 
accumulation of capital.   
In the literature about growth models, this process, however, is not analyzed from 
the standpoint of a typical capitalist economy, but it is assumed that there are important 
structural  differences  between  groups  of  capitalist  economies,  allowing  for  the 
identification  of  “central”  and  “peripheral”  countries  in  global  capitalism.  The  central 
economies are those where the most advanced production techniques penetrate first, while 
the periphery is made up of economies whose production lags behind, both in technology 
and organization (Ibid, p.81).  
Hence,  important  technological  asymmetries  can  be  assumed  to  exist  between 
capitalist economies, which permit characterizing a technological gap. This technological 
gap is seen as the basic reason why growth of productivity – and consequently of per capita 
income – is lower in the periphery than the center, giving rise to unequal development 
between the two.  
In this context, the elimination of the technological gap is a necessary condition for 
underdeveloped  or  peripheral  economies  to  catch  up  with  the  developed  or  central 
economies.  Since  technical  progress  is  largely  incorporated  in  new  machinery  and 
equipment,  the  reduction  of  the  technological  gap  presupposes  a  greater  effort  to 
accumulate capital by peripheral than by central economies.    3 
However, the kind of specialization and the heterogeneous productive structure of 
peripheral economies can hinder this greater effort at capital accumulation. The reason is 
that peripheral economies are specialized in the production of primary goods mainly for 
export. The need for consumption of durable goods and investment in these economies is 
met by imports from the central economies. Since the income elasticity of these economies‟ 
exports is generally low while the income elasticity of imports of manufactures is generally 
high,  it  follows  that  the  long-term  balance  of  payments  equilibrium  imposes  that  the 
peripheral economies grow at a slower pace than the central ones. It further follows, then, 
that the external constraint imposed by the productive structure of the peripheral countries 
reinforces and perpetuates the technological gap, since it makes more difficult the effort to 
accumulate capital in order to sustain a relatively higher rate of growth by these countries.   
Based on this general framework, the aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship 
between capital accumulation, the technological gap and the long term external restriction 
to growth of peripheral economies. Our basic hypothesis is that capital accumulation, under 
certain  conditions,  can  overcome  this  external  constraint  on  growth,  as  long  as  the 
accumulation effort is able to  engender a structural change in these economies, i.e., to 
induce a transformation in the productive structure that increases the relative participation 
of  more  technologically  dynamic  sectors.  This  structural  shift  will  result  in  a  gradual 
increase in the income elasticity of exports and a reduction in the income elasticity of 
imports, thus boosting real output growth to a level compatible with long-term equilibrium 
in the balance of payments.  
We set up the logical consistency of these arguments through a Kaldorian growth 
model in which: (i) investment in the modernization of capital goods permits the absorption 
of new technologies, enabling the production of goods with higher technological content; 
and (ii) the incorporation of new technologies induces a structural shift in the economy that 
permits an increase in income elasticity of exports and a decrease in income elasticity of 
imports. Finally, we present a case study of the Brazilian economy in the 1950-80 period. 
During this period, we illustrate that the greater capital accumulation effort that happened 
allowed for a structural change that relaxed the external constraint to long-term growth.    4 
The article is organized in six sections including this introduction. In Section II we 
develop a theoretical-conceptual framework that relates structural change with the external 
restriction.  This  framework  is  developed  from  the  contributions  of  the  Latin  American 
evolutionary and structuralist literatures.  In Section  III we present the relation between 
capital  accumulation  and  technological  progress  based  on  the  Kaldor-Mirrlees  growth 
model.  In  Section  IV  we  present  a  hybrid  growth  model  that  integrates  the  external 
restriction, based on the post-Keynesian literature on growth with balance of payments 
constraints, and investment in modernization of capital equipment in a context of structural 
change. In Section V we discuss the Brazilian economy during 1950-1980 as a successful 
example of structural change induced by the effort capital accumulation, which permitted a 
relaxation, albeit only partial, of the external constraint to growth. Finally, in Section VI we 
summarize our conclusions. 
 
II – Structural change and external restriction 
 
The growth rate that is compatible with balance of payments equilibrium depends 
on the income elasticity of exports and imports. These in turn depend on the productive 
structure of the economy. Developed and developing countries have different productive 
structures reflecting the fundamental differences in their technological qualification, i.e., in 
their capacity both to produce own technical knowledge and to imitate that developed in 
other parts of the world (Verspagen, 1993, p.126).  
These differences in technological qualification are reflected in greater participation 
of technologically more dynamic sectors in the productive structure of developed countries 
than  in  developing  ones.  Therefore,  developed  countries  have  a  greater  number  of 
economic sectors in which firms operate on the so-called “technological frontier”. Hence 
their basket of exports will be made up mainly of products with high added value and high 
technological content, products for which the income elasticity of exports is high. From this 
it follows that the so-called technological gap
1 is an important determinant of the income 
elasticity of exports, and thus of the rate of growth compatible with  balance of payments 
                                                 
1 On the concept of the technological gap, see Fagerberg (1988).    5 
equilibrium  (Dosi,  Pavitt  and  Soete,  1990,  p.26).  As  a  corollary  of  this  reasoning,  the 
growth rate that is compatible with balance of payments equilibrium tends to be higher in 
developed than in developing countries
2.  
The low technological dynamism of many developing countries, notably in Latin 
America, explains the weakness of the growth impulses provided by expansion of internal 
and external demand (Holland and Porcile, 2005, p.42). For developing countries to reduce 
the external constraint to growth they must be able to make changes in their productive 
structures.  These  changes  must  in turn  enable  alterations  in the income elasticities of 
demand  for  exported  products  so  as  to  reduce  the  degree  of  exposure  to  external 
imbalances.  
 
II.1 – Structural change, specialization pattern and technology gap 
 
Structural change can be promoted by an effort to accumulate capital that leads, 
through modernization of the stock of capital, to a smaller technological gap. The reason, 
as pointed out by Kaldor (1957), is that a significant part of “technological progress” is 
incorporated in new machinery and equipment, so that a greater effort to accumulate capital 
also  means  a  greater  effort  to  acquire  and  incorporate  new  technologies.  From  this  it 
follows that the technological gap dynamic depends, among other variables, on the pace of 
capital accumulation. In this context, a greater capital accumulation effort will work to 
reduce the technological gap and thus increase the technological content of exports, in turn 
spurring  growth  of  exports  and  the  economic  growth  rate  compatible  with  balance  of 
payments equilibrium. 
According to  Dosi,  Pavitt  and Soete (op.  cit., p. 199), an  economy‟s  pattern of 
growth is related to its pattern of technological change. Hence, considering the relative 
performance  of  countries  and  the  balance  of  payments  constraint,  the  relative  level  of 
                                                 
2 Based on an econometric  model of growth and North-South trade, Dutt (2003) shows  that the income 
elasticity of exports of countries of the North to those of the South (that is, the income elasticity of imports 
from countries of the South) in the 1964-1995 period was 1.67, while the income elasticity of exports from 
the Southern countries to the Northern ones was 1.27. Therefore, the ratio between these two elasticities 
shows that, in long-term equilibrium, countries of the South must grow less than their Northern counterparts, 
thus generating a dynamic of divergence of per capita incomes over the long run.      6 
technology applied in production not only determines each country‟s level of income, but 
also affects the possibilities for growth and the rate of capital accumulation.  
The  level  of  technological  development  is  related  to  the  country‟s  pattern  of 
specialization. Economies specialized in sectors with low income elasticity of demand are 
more exposed to external imbalances, which translates into lower rates of growth.  
Through the development of the technological capacity, the launch of new products 
that represent innovations in the international market spurs exports. This in turn helps offset 
the higher levels of imports due to increasing income and the greater demand this generates 
endogenously.  But  innovation  depends  on  investment  in  knowledge  and  its  subsequent 
materialization in intermediate and final consumer goods. The emergence of new products 
and sectors is the result of technological change, which in turn explains structural changes. 
Economies that are able to develop and absorb new technologies manage to modify the 
sectorial composition of their industry and disseminate technological advances to the rest of 
the economy (Cimoli et al., 2005, p. 12). 
The existence of abundant natural resources and labor can sustain high growth rates 
for a certain period without a great effort to invest in know-how (technology). But plentiful 
natural resources alone are not enough to sustain growth over the long run. This happens 
for two reasons. The first is that growth based on abundant factors of production does not 
promote structural change and increase in the productivity of the whole economy, besides 
reproducing undesirable situations of unequal income distribution, poor-quality jobs and 
structural  heterogeneity.  Second,  economies  specialized  in  natural  resources  are  more 
vulnerable to changes in the international economy and shifting patterns of demand. In 
contrast, when the bases for growth are the incomes generated by technology and know-
how, this same knowledge is an instrument that permits the economy to respond to changes 
in the competitive environment. Inversely, when the source of income is highly dependent 
on an abundant resource, the economy will tend to lack the technological capacity to adjust 
to new competitive situations (Cimoli et al., op. cit., pp. 32-33). 
In this sense, reduction in the technological gap in the long run requires economies 
to be able to transform their productive structure, from a growth pattern based on income 
generated by the abundance of some production factor to a growth pattern based on income   7 
generated by technology. In this transformation process, the more dynamic and knowledge-
disseminating sectors are expected to attain growing weight in the productive structure. The 
dynamic effects among sectors, along with their virtuous relationship with investment in 
technology,  are  necessary  to  combine  rapid  productivity  growth  with  high  rates  of 
employment,  reducing  the  structural  heterogeneity  that  is  characteristic  of  developing 
countries. According to Cimoli et al. (op. cit., p. 33), in economies with little structural 
change, localized increments in productivity are of little help to reduce informality and 
inequality. 
As  less  developed  countries  make  their  own  efforts  to  foster  technology,  their 
technologies  or  capital  equipment  will  become  more  standardized,  the  technological 
disadvantage in international trade will decline and other competitive factors will gain more 
importance  than  the  production  costs  related  to  the  availability  of  labor  and  natural 
resources.   
For Holland and Porcile (2005, p. 60), the reduction (or elimination) of structural 
heterogeneity, as well as the convergence of internal per capita income to that prevailing in 
the  rest  of  the  world  depends  on  a  sustained  effort  by  each  country  to  strengthen  its 
technological capacities. Indeed, enhanced technological learning can generate a long-term 
increase  in  technological  capacity.  A  possible  corollary  of  the  reduction  in  structural 
heterogeneity is the change in the productive structure in the sense of diversifying exports 
toward goods with more technological and demand dynamism.  
Therefore, a reduction in the technological gap induces a reduction of structural 
heterogeneity and an increase in the wage level of developing countries vis-à-vis developed 
ones. International convergence – catching up – requires an increase in the technological 
capacity  of  more  backward  countries  to  reduce  their  distance  from  the  technological 
frontier (Ibid, p. 57). 
In the development of the model presented in the section IV, the technological gap 
is represented by the difference in the average age of the stock of capital between the   8 
backward country and the frontier
3, assuming that the internal economy‟s stock of capital is 
older than that of the frontier. Our aim with this model is to show how modernizing the 
domestic versus the external stock of capital can reduce the technological gap and thus 
obtain a faster growth rate without producing disequilibrium in the balance of payments. 
 
III – Investment in modernizing the stock of capital: A Kaldorian model 
 
From  the  discussions  presented  in  the  previous  section,  we  can  advance  the 
theoretical hypothesis that investment in the latest generation of capital equipment precedes 
structural change, since (i) technological progress is incorporated in new machinery and 
equipment;  (ii)  there  is  a  not  negligible  technological  gap  between  developed  and 
developing countries; and (iii) there is a relation between the technological gap and the 
productive structure of developing countries. Therefore, one can conclude that structural 
change  results  in  a  faster  process  of  capital  accumulation,  in  which  companies  of  the 
developing  country  acquire  new  capital  goods  and  thus  enhance  their  technological 
qualification, which works to close the technological gap.  
To give a more formal treatment to the proposition above, we will introduce the 
analytical perspective of the Kaldor and Mirrlees‟s (1962) model in the context of growth 
models with a balance of payments constraint. In this sense, the idea of investment in the 
latest-generation  of  capital  equipment  derived  from  the  Kaldor-Mirrlees  model  can  be 
introduced in the model of balance of payments constraints by Thirlwall (1979), associating 
the dependence of the income elasticities of imports and exports to the average age of the 
economy‟s stock of capital. Elaborating in analytical form this association (see Section IV), 
we will draw a connection between the growth rate compatible with balance of payments 
equilibrium  and  the  guaranteed  growth  rate.  Therefore,  we  will  show  that  an  effort  to 
accumulate capital can relax the external constraint. 
                                                 
3 According to Verspagen (1993, p.128), the technological gap is a ratio between the technological capacities 
of a certain country and the technological frontier. In this form, we can say that G (technological gap) is: G = 
Tn/Ts, where T is the technological capacity of the North (n) and South (s).   9 
The growth model developed by  Kaldor and Mirrlees starts from the traditional 
Keynesian approach, in which companies investment decisions play a fundamental role in 
output  growth.  In  A  New  Model  of  Economic  Growth,  technical  progress  is  treated 
explicitly  as  a  rate  of  modernization  of  the  new  „vintage‟  of  machines,  as  the  main 
determinant of economic growth
4. 
According to the  Kaldor-Mirrlees model, in each period  machines that are newly 
produced will be more productive than the ones produced in the previous period. Therefore, 
the machines produced today are technically better than past models. In other words, the 
fixed capital from the current vintage is more productive than that of preceding vintages. 
This assumption derives from the fact that the latest technology is incorporated in the most 
recent vintage. The theoretical hypothesis of this model is that the machines used in a 
determined vintage have the same efficiency over their useful lifetimes, but machines from 
the last vintage are more productive than past models.   
However, a machine can be retired before it reaches the end of its useful life due to 
„technological obsolescence‟
5. The minimum condition to keep the machine in operation is 
when the revenue generated by a worker operating this machine (Pt-T) is exactly equal to his 
remuneration (W), both in real terms: 
t T t W P            (1) 
Equation (1) indicates the moment the machine ceases to be profitable. Profit is the 
stimulus for the entrepreneur to invest in „new machines‟, to replace unprofitable ones and 
boost  productivity,  and  consequently  national  income.  This  process  throughout  the 
economy  represents  investment  in  modernization  of  capital  that  increases  economic 
productivity.
6 
Besides the profit incentive, the process of replacing machines, i.e., modernization 
of  the  stock  of  capital,  can  speed  up  when:  (i)  the  real  wage  increases  faster  than 
                                                 
4See also Kaldor (1957). 
5 The term employed by Kaldor and Mirrlees when the machine‟s profitability becomes zero. Thus the capital 
good will be in operation only as long as its revenue is greater than or equal to its variable costs. 
6 Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962), as well as Kaldor (1957), argued that the rate of productivity growth, as well as 
that of technical progress itself, is endogenous to the growth rate of the investment per worker. However, part 
of technical progress is due to improvement in human capital.    10 
productivity
7,  and  (ii)  the  „technology  incorporation  rate‟  accelerates,  i.e.,  more  new 
machines appear in the market in a shorter period of time because of faster incorporation of 
the latest technical innovations. The inverse would lengthen the average economic lifetime 
of capital (by delaying the technological obsolescence of capital).
8 From the standpoint of 
international competition, a longer economic lifetime of the domestic stock of machines 
could impair competitiveness relatively to foreign competitors. 
In summary, for Kaldor and Mirrlees the introduction of machinery and equipment 
of the latest generation is fundamental to determine the pace of economic growth. If, on the 
one  hand,  these  investments  expand  productive  capacity  and  increase  aggregate 
productivity, on the other, by  boosting  demand from  capital  goods  industry, they can 
accelerate  the  incorporation  of  innovations  in  the  machines  the  capital  goods  sector 
produces. The  capital goods  sector, by its dynamic nature,  plays an important role  in 
determining economic growth and a country‟s type of international insertion. Hence, the 
process of industrialization toward more dynamic sectors can  also permit technological 
progress to be reflected in an increase in wages instead of just a reduction in prices. 
 
IV – An accumulation model with external constraint 
 
In order to develop our analytical model showing that capital accumulation, under 
certain conditions, can overcome external constraint on growth, we shall now introduce 
Thirlwall‟s concept of growth rate of the balance of payments. A simple formalization of 
the concept of growth rate compatible with balance of payments equilibrium can be found 
in Thirlwall (1979), McCombie e Thirlwall (1994)
9 among others.  For our aim, we follow 
from  the  growth  rate  of  real  output  that  is  compatible  with  balance  of  payme nts 
equilibrium: 
                                                 
7 This can happen when wage goods become relatively more expensive than capital goods and when the local 
currency appreciates, in the case of an open economy. 
8 However, the rate of incorporated new technology depends on the nature of the capital good to which it is 
incorporated. Capital goods with low technological intensity tend to have a slower incorporat ed rate than do 
those that have greater technological content. For example, the rate of technology incorporat ed  in the 
machinery used in the food industry is comparatively slower than that in the aeronautical industry. 







       (2) 
 
Where yt is the growth rate of output,  t   is exports income elasticity,  t  is imports 
income elasticity and  t z is the rate of growth of the rest of the world income. Equation (2) is 
the well known “Thirlwall‟s law”. This law, as represented, requires that the international 
mobility of capital is equal to zero so that countries cannot borrow to finance the deficits on 
current  account
10.  We will ass ume in this paper that the current account deficit has 
negligible  impact  on  the  rate  of  growth  consistent  with  the  balance  of  payments 
(McCombie and Roberts, 2002, p 95). Thus, Equation ( 2)  can be  considered a good 
approximation of the external constraint to economic growth in the long run.  
By assumption,  capital accumulation does not affect “Thirlwall‟s law” since the 
income elasticities of exports (ʵt) and imports (πt) depend on the productive structure, 
which  is  considered  to  be  independent  of  the  pace  of  capital  accumulation.  Figure  1 
illustrates the equilibrium line of the balance of payments (the 45-degree line) established 
by equation (2). The region above this line represents an external surplus and that below it 









                                                 
10 An extension of Thirlwall‟s model for an economy with capital flows has been made by Moreno-Brid 
(1998-1999), among others.   12 
Figure 1: Possible combinations between yt and  t z and the external constraint 
 
Our objective below is to endogenize the income elasticities of Thirlwall‟s model to 
make them dependent on the average age of the stock of capital in the economy, following 
Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962). We assume that the more modern or newer an economy‟s 
capital goods are, the greater will be the technological content of its output, and hence the 
greater the income elasticity of its exports and the lower the income elasticity of its imports. 
Therefore, it is possible to associate the growth rate compatible with equilibrium in the 
balance  of  payments  and  the  guaranteed  growth  rate.  An  increase  in  the  effort  to 
accumulate  capital,  with  an  impact  on  the  productive  structure,  will  lead,  through 
modernization of the industrial park, to an increase in the technological content of exports 
and hence an increase in the income elasticity of exports and the growth rate compatible 
with balance of payments equilibrium. 
Thus  we  assume  that  the  ratio  between  these  elasticities  is  linked  to  the 
technological gap and has an inverse relation with the ratio between the useful lifetimes of 
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1  f      (3), 
where Tt is the average useful life of domestic capital goods, T
*
t is the average useful life of 
foreign  capital  goods,  and  the  ratio  between  the  two  variables  is  a  measure  of  the   13 
technological gap. Thus, the productive structure of both economies (domestic and foreign) 
will depend on the average age of the stock of capital in each one. 
If T > T*, that is, the time interval after which the domestic equipment is replaced, is 
greater than that abroad, the pace of substituting domestic capital equipment is slower than 
it  is  abroad,  meaning  that  technical  progress  occurs  faster  abroad.  This  causes  the 
technological  gap between the two economies  to widen
11. With this reasoning, we can 
assume there  is an inverse relation between the variation of the income elasticities of 
exports and imports and the ratio Tt / T
*
t. Suppose that occurs a fall in the income elasticity 
of exports ʵ relatively to the income elasticity of imports π. Then we assume this decline 
indicates that the rate of substitution of capital equipment in the domestic economy has 
become slower than that in the external economy, i.e., the ratio Tt / T
*
t  has increased. 
Therefore, if T > T
*, then ʵ < π. The inverse reasoning also applies. 
Based on the Kaldor-Mirrlees model (1962), we consider that: 









f T       0
'
2  f      (4) 
where w is the rate of increase of real wages and q is the growth rate of labor productivity.
12 
Supposing that real wages are exogenously determined and the exchange rate is pegged and 
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3  f      (5) 
Given this hypothesis, the difference in the technological gap between two periods 
will show the ratio of the unit cost per domestic worker vis-à-vis the unit cost of per foreign 
worker. In this model, when the growth of the wage rate increases faster than the growth of 
worker  productivity,  firms  will  try  to  accelerate  the  modernization  of  their  capital 
equipment to defend themselves against the fall in profitability
13. In the Kaldor-Mirrlees 
model, wages are negatively correlated with the average useful life of machinery, making T 
                                                 
11 As in Cimoli (2005). 
12 In a steady state growth path the growth rate of labor productivity increases at a rate equal to the growth of 
investment (Kaldor and Mirrlees, 1962, p 63). 
13 See Marquetti (2004).   14 
an endogenous variable. When wages increase, T decreases, prompting firms to replace old 
machines with new, more productive, ones. 
Assuming the existence of static and dynamic economies of scale such as that the 
growth of labor productivity in both economies depends on the growth rate of real output, 
that is, assuming that “Kaldor-Verdoorn law” is valid, we can write: 
1 .    t t y q    
1 . 
   t t z q    
Substituting  the  rate  of  capital  accumulation  (k)  for  the  growth  rate  of  national 
output (y) in the Kaldor-Verdoorn equation, we have the following for both economies: 
1 .    t t k q    


   1 . ' t t k q     
Based on Foley and Michl (1999, p.25), and assuming full utilization of productive 
capacity (as in the Kaldor-Mirrlees model), we can express the profitability (R) as: 









f R       0
,
4  f      (6), 
where W is also real wages and Q the average output per worker in real terms.  
This also allows us to express equation (6) in the form of a variation rate: 









f r        0
'
5  f     (7) 
Considering equations (5) and (7), we have: 
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6  f      (8) 
 
Equation (8) shows that the ratio between the average useful lifetimes of domestic 
capital  equipment  relatively  to  that  of  foreign  capital  equipment  depends  on  the  ratio   15 
between the domestic and foreign rates of return. If wage costs are growing faster in the 
domestic economy than they are abroad, decreasing domestic rate of return, then domestic 
capitalists will accelerate the investment to modernize their capital equipment to enable 
obtaining higher productivity, to sustain profits in the face of the upward movement in 
wages. 
 
Substituting equation (8) in equation (3) produces: 
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8  f       (9) 
Then, substituting equation (9) and equation (2) leads to: 
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,
9  f      (10) 
We finally have, according to our hypotheses about the structure of the economy, 
the equation of economic growth with the balance of payments constraint. Equation (10) 
shows that the higher the domestic rate of return is vis-à-vis its external counterpart, the 
slower the pace will be of modernizing the domestic stock of capital vis-à-vis the pace 
abroad. This implies that domestic output will grow at a slower rate than in the rest of the 
world. With a higher rate of return in the domestic economy, companies feel less pressure 
to invest to modernize the country‟s stock of capital. Therefore, the model assumes induced 
innovation as a passive element of the investment on capital expenditure. The technological 
gap determines the difference between the income elasticities of exports and imports, and 
this  in  turn  depends  on  the  ratio  between  the  useful  lifetimes  of  domestic  and  foreign 
capital equipment. 
To evaluate the economy‟s growth dynamic, we start from the assumption that the 
growth rate of productive capacity (or potential output), 
__
y , is proportional to the growth of 
the stock of capital k , according to Domar (1946). Thus we write: 
k y .
__
            (11),   16 
where ˃ determines the pace of growth and is called the social productivity of capital. 
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We assume that the growth rate of the desired stock of capital by companies has two 
components: one autonomous, given by 0 g , and another dependent on the ratio between the 
domestic rate of return and that prevailing in the rest of the world
14, g1. This comes from 
the hypothesis of capital mobility among countries, so that an increase in the rate of return 
in the domestic economy relatively to the rest of the world will induce an increase in the 
foreign direct investment in the domestic economy, thus boosting growth of its stock of 

















1 0            (13) 
For there to be balanced long-term growth it is necessary for output to grow at a rate 
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1 0        (15) 
Equation (15), illustrated in Figure 2, gives the ratio between the growth rate in the 
domestic economy and its counterpart rate in the rest of the world, when the domestic 
                                                 
14  The  capital  accumulation  structure  follows  the  tradition  of  the  Harrod-Domar  model,  which  ignores 
financial capital, that is, there is no external financing to companies. Instead, companies finance themselves 
through retained earnings.    17 
economy is on a balanced growth path. On this path, output and productive capacity expand 
at the same rate. It is thus a concept equivalent to that of the “guaranteed growth rate” of 
Harrod‟s (1939) model.  
Equations  (10)  and  (14)  form  a  dynamic  system  with  two  equations  and  two 
endogenous variables, namely: (i) the relative structure of rates of return (ii) the relative 
structure of the rates of growth. Determination of the system‟s endogenous variables can be 
seen in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Balanced growth with structural change 
 
Figure  2 shows what  happens  to  the  growth  dynamics  if there is  an  exogenous 
increase in the growth pace of the desired stock of capital by firms, i.e., an increase in 
autonomous investment. This increase will shift the locus of balanced growth downward 
and rightward, thus increasing the domestic economy‟s growth relative to that prevailing in 
the rest of the world. However, this acceleration in the accumulation of capital will initially 
cause disequilibrium in the balance of payments, in the form of a current account deficit.    18 
For the external equilibrium to be reestablished it is necessary for the domestic rate 
of return to decline relatively to that in the rest of the world, to induce investments in more 
modern and productive capital equipment in the domestic economy to counteract the fall in 
profitability. It happens that the greater investment in capital equipment will act to reduce 
the technological gap, thus causing an increase in the ratio between the income elasticities 
of exports and of imports. This causes a structural change in the domestic economy that 
acts to increase its growth rate compatible with balance of payments equilibrium.  
From this argumentation we can conclude that the external constraint on long-term 
growth  can  be  relaxed  through  a  structural  change  that  narrows  the  technological  gap 
between the domestic economy and the rest of the world, a change that is induced by a 
greater  effort  to  accumulate  capital  by  domestic  firms.  It  thus  follows  that  capital 
accumulation is the engine that drives long-term growth for countries that are below the 
“technological frontier”.  
 
V – Capital accumulation and structural change: the Brazilian experience. 
 
From the post-War until 1980, Brazilian economy grew at high rates, dragged by 
capital accumulation. During the three and a half decades since the end of World War II 
three development plans were implemented - Plano de Metas (1956-61), I (1968-73) and II 
(1974-79) National Development Plan - which contributed to promote significant changes 
in the productive structure of the country. In spite of these changes, Brazilian economy 
continued  to  be  rather  closed  (opening  of  the  economy  started  in  late  1980s),  and  so 
characterized by an „inward oriented‟ growth pattern. As change in productive structure 
resulted from an import substitution strategy, with the leadership of state owned enterprises 
and foreign direct investment, we consider the Brazilian economy during the 1950-1980 
period an interesting case to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical model, as well as the 
conceptual framework relating structural change and external constraint, discussed in the 
above sections.  
Brazilian economic performance from 1947-80 – average growth rate above 6% aa - 
exceeded the observed in all developed and developing countries during the same period.   19 
This extraordinary rhythm of growth was interrupted by the external debt crisis in 1980-81, 
which brought constraints to the kind of financing employed by the development policies 
adopted until then.
15 
The period of accelerated growth was characterized by intense import substitution  
and absorption of  foreign  direct  investment, which resulted in the  consolidation  of  the 
domestic industry.
16 Table 1 illustrates the changes of the productive structure from 1947 to 
1980; with industry increasing its share in GDP from  26.0% in 1947 to 44.1% in 1980. In 
terms of manufacturing and mining industries the share in GDP increased from 20.3% to 
34.8%,  respectively.  Manufacture  and  mining  industries  pushed  growth  rate  of  the 
economy, expanding, on average, 8.6% aa from 1947 to 1980.
17 
 
Table 1: Brazil main sectors of activity as share (%) of GDP 
(1947, 1960, 1970, 1980) 
Sectors  1947  1960  1970  1980 
Agriculture  21,4  18,3  12,3  10,9 
Industry  26,0  33,2  38,3  44,1 
   Manufacturing and Mining  20,3  27,1  30,1  34,8 
   Civil Construction  4,6  5,0  5,8  7,3 
   Public Utility Industrial Services  1,1  1,1  2,4  1,9 
Services  55,7  51,5  56,2  52,7 
Source: IBGE-National Accounts 
                                                 
15 From 1980 to 2008, the average GDP growth was around 2.7% aa, with the priorities of economic policy 
aiming especially to stabilize prices and control the external accounts. A new growth cycle started in 2004, 
but the financial crisis in the developed world suddenly interrupted this growth trend. The average growth rate 
of GDP in the latter period (2004-2008) was 4.7% aa, at the same time the investment rate rose from 15.5% in 
2004 to 18.5% in 2008, according to the national accounts. 
16 According to Cassiolato and Lastres (2005, p. 1226), in 1980, Brazil concentrated the largest stock of 
foreign investment (US$ 17 billions) among developing countries. 
17  This expansion was not continuous  over  time, standing out the period 1963 -67 as the least dynamic 
(average growth of 2.7% aa). From 1968 onwards begins the phase of faster growth, with industry growing 
9.8% aa.   20 
The  augmented  participation  of  industry  in  the  productive  structure  was  also 
accompanied by broad diversification of its structure. The 1970s marks the establishment of 
a well developed production structure of durable and intermediary goods, concluding an 
important stage of the process of import substitution.
18 The diversification in the industrial 
production also led to the diversification of exports: in 1964 the share of manufactured and 
semi-manufactured goods reached 14.0% and in 1980 this percentage increased to 57.0%.
19 
The strategy of industrialization through import substitution supported by tariff and 
non tariff  barriers meant closing the economy and therefore the  import coefficient (the 
share  of imports  in  total  foreign  trade   of the  country)  was  around  50%  until  1970, 
expanding in the 1970s, particularly after the first oil shock. The average coefficient of the 
period 1947-80 was 52%.
20 
As mentioned, economic growth driven by capital accumulation, and supported by 
development plans and by foreign  direct investment, characterized an economic model of 
industrialization  „inward  oriented‟.  The  share  of  exports  in  GPD  was  below  10% 
throughout the period, unless the first two years after the War. The rate of investment, in 
turn, showed an upward trend, starting from 14.7% in 1947 and reaching 24.0% in 1980. 
The financing of this process was done, in a large extent, with foreign investment 
and by state owned enterprises. It is in relation to the external sector that the Brazilian 
industrialization model showed its vulnerability. The large size of the Brazilian domestic 
market,  as  well  as  the  use  of  protectionist  policies  to  induce  industrialization,  did  not 
contributed to the improvement of external competitiveness of the industrial sector. One 
consequence of this bias resulted that exports, even rather diversified, were of products 
with low technological content, basically.  
In terms of the model summarized in Figure 2 this outcome means that the increase 
in  the  accumulation  rate  from  the  post-War  period  onwards  increased  the  potential  of 
                                                 
18 In 1980, according to the Industrial Census (IBGE) more than 50% of the value added of manufacturing 
and mining industries were of products classified as scale-intensive (38.6%), differentiated (11.7%) and 
engineering-based (2.8%). 
19 It is worth noting that even with the debt crisis in the 1980s, considering only manufactured exports, these 
amounted to more than 50% of total exports in 1981, and this percentage has remained at th is level or above 
until 2008, when it fell to 47.0% (MDIC). 
20 In the 1980s, according to the national accounts, due to the adjustment in the production structure caused by 
external constraint, this average fell to 40.0%.   21 
growth  of  the  Brazilian  economy  and  reduced  the  technological  gap.  However,  as 
mentioned, the acceleration  in  the accumulation of capital  causes  disequilibrium in  the 
balance of payments in the form of current account deficits. As seen, to reestablish the 
foreign equilibrium in order it becomes compatible with the greater growth potential, it is 
necessary that the external sector becomes more competitive. Looking at the Brazilian case, 
this means to say that the import substitution strategy should have reached also the capital 
goods industry and sectors more intensive in technology, in order to increase the income 
elasticity of exports in relation to the income elasticity of imports. According to the Kaldor-
Mirrlees model, the incentive to investment in new and more productive equipment would 
come from the fall in the domestic rate of return relatively to the developed economies. Our 
model suggests that, in the Brazilian case, domestic rates of return, due in great extent to 
the  high  degree  of  protection  of  domestic  market,  were  kept  higher  in  Brazil  than  in 
developed countries, and in this sense it did not contribute to the technological catch up.
21  
Following  the  theoretical  and  conceptual  approach  presented  in  section  II,  a 
productive structure  that is  dominated by industries with comparative advantages in the 
production of goods intensive in natural resources and low technology can sustain high 
growth rates only over a relatively short period of time. External finance can extend the 
period of accelerated growth, but  one must pay attention to the negative effects of this 
process. As the external debt rises, the degree of vulnerability of the economy increases, 
and the country is susceptible to a setback in its growth rate, as external financial conditions 
may change unfavorably. This was the case  in early 1980s when international financial 
markets ceased to lend to highly  indebted countries like Brazil and other Latin American 
economies, after the Mexican default in 1982. 
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of the Trade Balance and Capit al and Financial 
accounts from 1947 to 1985. From 1947 until the end of the 1960s,  the entrance of direct 
investment and changes in the productive structure helped to sustain balance of payment 
equilibrium. From 1970s onwards, the increased absorption of external savings was made 
possible  by  the  significant  increase  in  the  availability  to  international  liquidity.  The 
interruption of financial flows in 1982 lead to a dramatic contraction in domestic demand, 
                                                 
21 According to the national accounts, the share of wages in total output decreased from 40.7% in 1970 to 
38.4% in 1980.   22 
in order to generate high surpluses in the trade balance to help to fulfill debt commitments. 
According to Castro and Souza (2004), high trade surpluses after 1982 were made possible 
because  structural  changes  had  occurred  in  the  Brazilian  industry,  basically  those 
engendered by the II National Development Plan. As soon as the external problem had been 
controlled by the middle of the decade (1984-1985), GDP grew at significant rates (growth 
rates of GDP in 1984, 1985 and 1986 were 5.4 %, 7.8% and 7.5% respectively). It seemed 
then that the economy was returning to its growth path as shown in the 1950-80 period. 
However, after this heroic moment that followed the recession of the early 1980s, growth 
rates, paraphrasing Castro (2008), were close to semi-stagnation.
22 
 


































Balança comercial (FOB) CONTA CAPITAL E FINANCEIRA  
Source: BCB: Banco Central do Brasil, Balance of Payments. 
 
So, after the debt crisis in early 1980s, Brazilian economy showed a falling rate of 
capital accumulation, with severe consequences to its long term rate of growth. According 
to  the  model  proposed  in  section  IV,  the  decrease  in  capital  accumulation  implies  a 
                                                 
22 It should be remarked that during the 1980s and early 1990s Brazilian economy moved towards a high 
inflation regime. Because of that, real wages showed high volatility, productivity stagnated and long term 
investments were strongly disincentivated. According to Kilsztajn (1998), the rate of net profits in Brazil were 
more than twice those observed in developed countries in the 1980s.   23 
decrease in the equilibrium rate of growth of balance of payments.
23 This outcome becomes 
more dramatic considering that world economy since the 1990s shows a greater integration. 
This scenario puts m ore weight on the need  for the Brazilian economy  to reduce the 
technological gap in order to increase its long-term growth rate. 
 
VI – Conclusions.  
 
In this article we have argued that the external constraint to long-term growth – 
represented by the ratio between the income elasticities of exports and imports – can be 
relaxed  through  an  effort  to  accumulate  capital  that  prompts  a  structural  change  in 
peripheral economies, so as to reduce the technological gap.  
Based on the structuralist-evolutionary literature we have argued that a country‟s 
pattern of specialization is related to its level of technological development. Developed 
countries  have  a  greater  number  of  economic  sectors  where  firms  operate  on  the 
“technological  frontier”  because  they  have  a  higher  base  (benchmark)  of  technological 
development than do developing countries. Thus, the exports of developed countries mainly 
consist of products with higher added value and technological content. The technological 
development  embodied  in  the  production  of  consumer  and  capital  goods  leads  to  a 
structural  composition  of  industry  where  sectors  with  greater  technological  intensity 
prevail. For long-term growth, we assume that the local development of technology is more 
consistent than importing it. 
From this perspective, to close the technological gap, peripheral economies must be 
able to transform their productive structures, shifting toward sectors whose earnings are 
derived more from  exploiting knowledge, in detriment to sectors whose earnings come 
mainly from the abundance of a production factor. In this sense, we observed that  the 
existence of abundant natural resources and labor is, by itself, not sufficient to sustain long-
run  growth.  Therefore,  economies  specialized  in  sectors  with  low  income  elasticity  of 
                                                 
23 For an interpretation, having the Solow-Swan model as theoretical reference, for the stagnation of the 
Brazilian economy after the 1980s, see Bacha and Bonelli (2005).   24 
demand are more exposed to external imbalances, translating into lower rates of output 
growth. 
To formalize the relation between structural change and capital accumulation, we 
developed a model based on the contributions of Kaldor in the late 1950s and early 60s – 
whereby  investment  to  modernize  capital  equipment  permits  the  absorption  of  new 
technologies and hence enables the production of goods with growing technological content 
– and the 1970s, examining the restriction on demand imposed by the balance of payments 
equilibrium.  The  growth  model  proposed  with  these  characteristics  can  be  considered 
„hybrid‟. So the theoretical model developed showed the logical possibility that an increase 
in the desired rate of capital accumulation allows, through modernization of the existing 
capital  equipment,  to  increase  the  technological  content  of  domestic  production,  thus 
increasing the income elasticity of exports and reducing the income elasticity of imports.  
The historical experience of the Brazilian economy during the post-War period until 
1980 illustrates the validity of the hypothesis suggested in this paper. Indeed, in this period 
the Brazilian economy underwent a great structural shift induced by the accumulation of 
capital. This structural change permitted relaxing, even if only temporarily, the external 
constraint to growth, enabling high rates of real output growth.  
The acceleration in capital accumulation during the 1950-1980 period came mainly 
from autonomous investment, both by the government and from foreign direct investment. 
This situation changed starting in the 1980s, when the external debt crisis triggered a series 
of  macroeconomic  imbalances  that  undermined  Brazilian  economic  growth.  During  the 
phase of accelerated growth, the technological gap narrowed, but the failure to consolidate 
local production of technology because of subsequent external restrictions prevented the 
continued closing of this gap. Since the economic opening of the 1990s, the productive 
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